YouHua Chen XueKe Lu YouFang Chen Department of Renewable Resources, University of Alberta, Edmonton, T6G 2H1, Canada Department of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science, Queen Mary University of London, E1 4NS, UK School of Software, Harbin Normal University, Heilongjiang Province, China Computational Ecology and Software ISSN 2220-721X http://www.iaees.org/publications/journals/ces/online-version.asp 2014 4 1 12 21 International Academy of Ecology and Environmental Sciences Hong Kong 28 October 2013 2 December 2013 1 March 2014 species coexistence game theory colonization-extinction dynamics individual-based modeling In the present report, the coexistence and persistence time patterns of Prisoners' Dilemma game players were explored in 2D spatial grid systems by considering the impacts of the mortality-colonization temporal dynamic specifically. Our results showed that the waiting time for triggering a colonization event could remarkably influence and change the extinction patterns of both cooperators and defectors. Interestingly, a relatively high frequency of stochastic colonization events could promote the persistence of defectors but not cooperators. In contrast, a low frequency of stochastic- or constant-time colonization events could facilitate the persistence of cooperators but not defectors. However, a long waiting time would be detrimental to the survival of both game players and drives them to go extinction in faster rates. At last, it was found that colonization strength played a relatively weak role on influencing the coexistence scenarios of both game players, but should be kept small if the coexistence of game players is needed to maintain. In conclusion, our study provides evidence showing that the temporal trade-off of mortality and colonization activities would influence the evolution of PD game and the persistence of cooperators and defectors. DOI 10.0000/issn-2220-721x-compuecol-2014-v4-0002 http://www.iaees.org/publications/journals/ces/articles/2014-4(1)/coexistence-and-persistence-patterns-in-evolutionary-game-model.pdf