Hui Zhang Meng Gao Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Natural and Applied Sciences, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, Shaanxi 710027, China Key Laboratory of Coastal Environmental Processes and Ecological Remediation, Yantai Institute of Coastal Zone Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Yantai, 264003, China Computational Ecology and Software ISSN 2220-721X http://www.iaees.org/publications/journals/ces/online-version.asp 2015 5 4 299 316 International Academy of Ecology and Environmental Sciences Hong Kong 25 July 2015 3 August 2015 1 December 2015 evolutionary game theory social dilemma spatial structure repeated game enforcement network reciprocity To elucidate the mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation has been a core problem in biology, economics and sociology. Evolutionary game theory has proven to be an efficient approach to investigate the problem by using models based on so-called social dilemmas. Spatial structure is indicated to have an important effect on the evolution of cooperation and has been intensively studied during recent years. From this perspective, we review our studies in evolutionary dynamics based on a repeated game with three strategies, 'always defect' (ALLD), 'tit-for-tat' (TFT), and 'always cooperate' (ALLC). With mathematical analysis and numerical simulations, the results show that cooperation can be promoted in spatially-structured populations. Cooperators prevail against defectors by forming stable clusters, which is called the `spatial selection'. Meanwhile, lattice structure also inhibits cooperation due to the advantage of being spiteful. Furthermore, simulations demonstrate that a slight enforcement of ALLC can only promote cooperation when there is weak network reciprocity, while the catalyst effect of TFT on cooperation is verified. DOI 10.0000/issn-2220-721x-compuecol-2015-v5-0022 http://www.iaees.org/publications/journals/ces/articles/2015-5(4)/effect-of-spatial-structure-on-evolution-of-cooperation.pdf